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In Contracts Without Consent:  Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability,1 Omri Ben-Shahar, a talented and creative economic analyst
of law, advocates a principle—which he calls the “no-retraction” prin-
ciple2—that is so at odds with the existing structure of the common
law of contracts3 as to basically turn contract law upside down.  Ben-
Shahar’s no-retraction principle would radically alter the line between
agreement and no agreement, between liability for unkept promises
or assurances and no liability for such unkept promises or assurances.
Indeed, under a no-retraction regime, there would be no line between
agreement and no agreement, and contractual liability could exist
even in the absence of any communication (or what Ben-Shahar calls
a “proposal”)4 at all.  Transactions could be forced upon parties who
want nothing to do with them—either because they’ve walked away
from failed negotiations or because they were never in any negotia-
tions to begin with—but only on the terms that were or would have
been demanded by the unwilling party.  By incurring reliance expen-
ditures early in a contractual negotiation (or, apparently, before a
negotiation had even begun), a relying party could hold the other
negotiating party liable for those reliance expenses, regardless of
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Inasmuch as “[t]he central tenet of the civil law . . . is that promissory estoppel
does not exist,” David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action:  Promissory Estoppel, the Civil
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whether those expenses were incurred in reliance upon a promise.5
Ben-Shahar defends his proposal both as representing “a conceptual
advance”6 and as creating superior economic incentives relative to the
existing American common law doctrinal regime.7  He says that the
no-retraction regime is a conceptual advance because it is “a ‘natural’
legal platform for tracking the progress of [contractual] negotiations”
that “provides a more flexible set of tools for transforming the under-
standings between parties into legal obligations.”8  He says that the no-
retraction regime is superior on efficiency grounds to the existing
doctrinal regime because it would encourage precontractual reliance
where it is socially desirable to do so, while at the same time avoiding
any chilling effect on the incentive to enter and make proposals in
negotiations.9
In this brief Commentary, I take Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction pro-
posal as an opportunity to compare and contrast two alternative eco-
nomic approaches to thinking about the question of what sort of
statements or actions ought to trigger contractual liability.  Although
this question is often referred to as the issue of “precontractual liabil-
ity,”10 it is in fact much more general, involving the fundamental ques-
tion of why it is ever economically desirable to attach legal liability to a
party’s failure to transact.  I argue that, while Ben-Shahar’s proposal
may indeed encourage efficient early reliance, its likely inefficiency in
discouraging negotiations from even beginning and in encouraging
inefficient and unconsented transactions far outweighs its potential
efficiency benefits.  Thus, Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction regime is decid-
edly inferior on efficiency grounds to the current doctrinal approach.
Along the way, I hope to persuade the reader of a much more
general point.  Ben-Shahar’s conceptually confusing, practically im-
possible, and instrumentally unwise no-retraction idea is not the result
5
See, e.g., id. at 1845 (“[I]n situations in which parties have not completed the ne-
gotiations but merely have reached some preliminary understandings, . . . the optimal
remedy for retracting from the understandings and the proposal would be reliance
damages.”).
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Id. at 1847.
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See id. at 1847-53 (explaining the “[t]he [e]fficiency of the [n]o-[r]etraction [r]e-
gime”).
10 The best general discussion of “precontractual liability” remains E. Allan Farns-
worth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:  Fair Dealing and Failed Negotia-
tions, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987).
2004] PROMISSORY LIABILITY 1925
of bad economics, but of having taken a very rigorous and sound eco-
nomic model far too seriously and immodestly.  That model—known
either as “the reliance model” (in law and economics) or the “optimal
investment model” (in economics)—thinks that the fundamental prob-
lem solved by contractual law is to get the correct incentives for peo-
ple to make investments that increase the value of contractual transac-
tions.11  It worries that, if the law doesn’t give people a right to recover
their reliance investments when the transaction doesn’t occur because
the other party backs out, then they will have an inadequate incentive
to make such investments.  Providing them an automatic right to re-
cover fully compensatory damages in such an event, however, will give
people no incentive to economize on reliance investments.
While this may seem to suggest that all that we’ve gotten from the
model of reliance is the revelation of yet another doctrinal dilemma,
as I explain in more detail in the first Part, the model of reliance also
suggests a solution.  The problem with Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction
proposal lies not with the model of reliance that it is based upon.  The
problem with Ben Shahar’s proposal is that it forgets that there is a
huge difference between finding that a particular liability regime can
fix a particular, limited problem identified by such a formal (that is,
mathematical) model and advocating that regime as generally supe-
rior to the existing doctrinal system.  The problem is that, like any
model, the model of reliance is limited and illuminates only part of
the problem posed by the question of what sort of statements or ac-
tions ought to trigger contractual liability.  It is surely true both that
contract remedies do cut the risk to people of investing in the coop-
erative ventures that we call contracts and that it sometimes may be
desirable for people to begin to invest earlier, rather than later, in
such ventures.  Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction regime, like other propos-
als devised by economists,12 does cut the risk of investing to increase
the value of a contract and then being held up by a party who refuses
to bear her fair share of that investment.  But along the way, it creates
an incentive for people to incur early reliance expenses solely in order
to foist highly inefficient contracts upon other people, people with
11
For a lucid discussion of this point, see Aaron S. Edlin, Breach Remedies, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 174 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
12 For a description of some of the alternative solutions proposed, see Eric A. Pos-
ner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:  Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J.
829, 856-59 (2003).
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whom they may not even have been bargaining.  It thus undermines a
basic economic underpinning of contract law:  the promotion of effi-
cient, net-value-maximizing exchange.
Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction regime also mistakes the reliance prob-
lem, which clearly is part of the problem raised by precontractual li-
ability cases, for the whole problem.  The question of when contrac-
tual liability ought to attach to promissory statements is not only about
how people invest (or don’t) to increase the value of cooperation.  It
is also about the incentives people have in attempting to discern
whether cooperation is mutually beneficial in the first place.  Precon-
tractual liability effects incentives in dealmaking, incentives not re-
garding reliance investments that increase the size of the pie, but in-
centives to invest in order to acquire and transmit information about
the likelihood that there is any pie to split in the first place.  The
model of reliance does not capture those incentives.  It was not de-
signed to do so.
An alternative model, which I developed some years ago,13 does
address those incentives and, in so doing, tends to indicate that the
existing doctrinal structure accords quite closely with what an infor-
mationally efficient regime would look like.14  In this Commentary, af-
ter discussing the analytical development of the reliance model and
Ben-Shahar’s application of it in devising his no-retraction regime,
I review my alternative model and its conclusions.  I do so not to
prove that my approach—which may be called simply “the bargaining
model”—is “better” than Ben Shahar’s reliance model.  Neither model
captures the whole story.  By comparing these approaches, one sees
that they are complementary, not competitive.  More importantly, one
sees also that any proposal, such as Ben-Shahar’s, that immodestly asks
a model to do more than it was ever designed to do is bound to be
wrong.
I.  THE MODEL OF RELIANCE IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
CONTRACT LAW:  ITS REMEDIAL BEGINNINGS
The model of reliance had its beginnings, as did the economic
analysis of contract law more generally, in the analysis of contract
13
Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship:  Cheap Talk Economics and the
Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385 (1999).
14 Id. at 491-96.
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remedies.15  These beginnings may be illustrated with a simple buyer-
seller example.  As every contracts student learns, when the seller’s
opportunity cost is less than the valuation that the buyer places on a
good or service, then joint performance—the seller’s production and
delivery of the good and the buyer’s payment of the promised price—
makes each party better off than she would be without such a deal and
generates a net increase in social value.
In a more complicated example, a swimwear manufacturer that
has built up brand loyalty may wish to extend the value of that intan-
gible asset to suncare products.  But this swimwear company does not
have any experience or expertise in making such products and hence
is interested in contracting with a company that does have such exper-
tise.  Joint performance in this example means that the swimwear
company will not only license its trade name for use on the new sun-
care products, but will also cooperate in marketing and promoting the
new suncare line.  The suncare company, for its part, must produce a
suncare product and packaging that will succeed on the market.  The
gain from successful cooperation is a mutually profitable new product
line.
In each of these examples, for gains from exchange to be realized,
one or more of the parties may need to incur costs that may not be re-
coverable unless the two contracting parties actually cooperate by per-
forming.  In the first example, the seller may be producing goods tai-
lored to the particular buyer’s needs and so will recover only a portion
of the cost of production by reselling if this particular buyer fails to
perform.  In the second example, at least some of the money spent by
the swimwear company in promoting a new line of suncare products
will be lost if the particular line being promoted is never produced
and brought to market.  Similarly, some fraction of the money spent
by the suncare company in designing and testing a new suncare prod-
uct will be lost if the swimwear company backs out of the deal and re-
fuses to license the use of its name or to help in marketing and pro-
moting the new product.
15
See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pts. 1-2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936–1937), for an early exploration of the concept of
reliance in contract theory.  For a further discussion of the influence of Lon Fuller and
William Perdue’s perspective on law and economics in contract theory, see Avery Katz,
Reflections on Fuller and Perdue’s The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:  A Positive
Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 541 (1988).  Eric Posner also provides a
useful historical survey of the economic analysis of contract theory in Posner, supra
note 12.
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In the legal literature on contracts, such costs are referred to as
the parties’ “reliance expenditures.”16  A main concern of economic
analysts of contract law has been whether contract law default reme-
dies create an incentive for efficient levels of such reliance, where the
efficient level of reliance is defined as that which maximizes the ex-
pected net social value of exchange.17  Here, “expected” means the av-
erage value of exchange, given the known uncertainty surrounding
performance.18  “Efficient reliance” is reliance that maximizes the ex-
pected net value of exchange, where the net value is discounted by the
known probability of non-performance.19  If, for instance, an owner
knows that bad weather or a labor strike may prevent her builder from
completing a restaurant addition on time, then even though she will
increase her profits by making early reliance expenditures in hiring
new staff and buying new equipment that allow her to open the new
addition if it is completed on the promised date, the owner should
factor in the probability of late completion before relying in this way.
On this calculus, if the owner expects additional profits of $200 from
timely (versus late) completion by the contractor, then she will effi-
ciently invest the $100 in early reliance necessary to realize those addi-
tional profits if and only if the probability of timely completion by the
contractor is bigger than 0.5.20
An early and important insight from the economic analysis of
contract remedies was that a damage measure that fully compensates
the victim of contract breach will cause such a victim to incur ineffi-
ciently high reliance expenses.21  If the owner in the above example is
awarded her full, expectation-based measure of damages when the
contractor is indeed late in finishing the addition, then the owner will
end up with a net return of $100 regardless of whether or not the con-
tractor finishes on time.  Because she is, in effect, fully insured against
breach, the owner is better off making the reliance investment than
16
This notion of the reliance interest in contract law dates at least from Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 15, pt. 1.
17
For a discussion of the concept of “efficient reliance,” see Richard Craswell, Of-
fer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 489-94 (1996).
18
Id. at 486-87.
19
Id. at 490-91.
20
This example is drawn from and developed in much more detail in ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 248-58 (3d ed. 2000).
21
This result was first formally established by Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for
Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980).
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not, regardless of the probability of breach.22  The owner will there-
fore disregard the probability of breach in making the reliance in-
vestment and, in particular, will make the investment even when the
probability of breach is too high (above 0.5 in this example).
In more technical, economic language, a legal rule that requires
the breaching party to make the breach victim whole regardless of the
reasonableness of the victim’s reliance expenditures raises a moral
hazard problem, inducing too much reliance by the victim.  While
economists have generalized the term “moral hazard” to refer to any
situation in which contracting terms effect incentives for unobserved
actions,23 the term originated with insurance contracts,24 where full in-
surance against a particular loss may cut the insured’s incentive to
take care to reduce the likelihood that the loss occurs and/or the
amount of the loss.  Insurers have known about the moral hazard
problem for a long time.  Unsurprisingly, they have developed well-
known contractual solutions, such as deductibles (whose primary ef-
fect is to strengthen the insured’s incentive to prevent the loss) and
coinsurance (whose primary effect is to strengthen the insured’s in-
centive to lessen the magnitude of the loss).  Contract law does not, by
contrast, seem to have found a way to deal with the moral hazard
problem induced by fully compensatory damages for breach.  Cutting
a breach victim’s damage award by setting damages equal only to her
reasonable (that is, efficient) reliance expenditures does eliminate the
moral hazard problem, but only by creating another moral hazard
problem in the form of too great an incentive for contract breach by
the other party.25  While it is theoretically possible to design a liqui-
dated damage measure that would optimize both the promisee’s in-
centive to rely and the promisor’s incentive to take precautions
22
To more concretely illustrate this point, observe that, if the owner makes the
investment, she will get $200 - $100 = $100 regardless of whether the owner performs,
since in this case the expectation-based remedy would give her the $200 value from
expected performance.  If the owner does make the investment, then she will get $0 if
the contractor performs—because she is not ready to open when the addition is fin-
ished—and $100 if the contractor fails to perform—because this was her expected
profit.  Thus, the owner is clearly better off making the reliance investment than not
doing so.
23 ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 478-88 (1995).
24
See id. at 477 n.1 (stating that, as originally used, “moral hazard” referred to the
problem “aris[ing] when an insurance company [could not] observe whether the in-
sured exert[ed] effort to prevent a loss”).
25
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 20, at 194-96 (discussing parties’ incentives to
perform and breach under scenarios of low and high reliance damages).
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against breach,26 the common law has traditionally been skeptical about
enforcing liquidated damage provisions.27  Instead, common law judges
have indicated a great attachment to expectation damages as a “hard”
default, meaning a default rule that it is difficult for the parties to vary
through explicit contractual language.28
Were one convinced that the overreliance problem is a “real”
problem, then this doctrinal state of affairs would be disturbing.  But
there is no reason to think that overreliance is a real problem.  Even
as a purely theoretical matter, overreliance arises only for certain
kinds of reliance investments and for certain kinds of (quite simple)
contracts.29  The assumptions about contract remedies that drive the
overreliance problem, moreover, are fanciful.  For a whole variety of
reasons—including the American rule on attorneys’ fees and the in-
ability to prove all elements of loss—expectation-based damages do
not fully compensate victims of breach,30 and businesspeople decid-
edly prefer performance to breach.31
II.  THE MODEL OF RELIANCE:  ITS EXTENSION TO PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL AND THE PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY PROBLEM
The fact that the common law of contract has never seemed to
worry about the overreliance problem thus seems to make very good
economic sense.  When it comes to reliance, the problem that common
26
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property:  The Model of Precau-
tion, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1985) (illustrating the optimal incentives that may be
created through stipulating damages when contracting).
27
For a discussion of the common law approach and the classic economic critique
of that approach’s skepticism toward liquidated damages, see Charles J. Goetz & Rob-
ert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:  Some Notes
on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
28
I refer here, again, to the skepticism with which courts still approach the en-
forcement of liquidated damage terms, a skepticism decried by, but nonetheless faith-
fully followed by, Judge Richard Posner in his opinion in Lake River Corp. v. Carborun-
dum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289-92 (7th Cir. 1985).
29
This body of work is insightfully summarized and explained in Edlin, supra note
11, at 176-77.
30
This point, among many others, can be found in the critique of overreliance
presented by Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the
Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1357-61 (2003).
31 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating Co-
operation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1754-55 (2001)
(citing reasons why merchants in the cotton industry prefer performance over pay-
ment for breach).
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law judges and the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts32
have sought to address is not that common law remedies are so gen-
erous as to induce overreliance, but that common law rules regarding
contract formation are so formalistic that parties will often reasonably
rely on a promise and yet not receive any remedy at all because they
relied before a contract had been legally created—this is the problem
addressed by the doctrine of promissory estoppel and section 90 of
the Restatement.33  By creating a cause of action for a promisee who rea-
sonably relied upon a promise that the promisor should have rea-
sonably expected to induce such reliance, promissory estoppel dis-
penses with the traditional notion that contracts are created by mutual
assent.  Under traditional contract formation doctrine, contractual li-
ability follows only if both parties should reasonably have expected to
be bound.34  Under promissory estoppel, by contrast, liability depends
upon the parties’ shared reasonable expectation that one of them
would begin to make “definite and substantial” reliance expenditures
in response to the other’s promise.35
There are at least three ways to rationalize promissory-estoppel-
based liability.  The first says that promissory estoppel really just fixes
gaps in contract enforceability caused by the hyperformality of com-
mon law contract formation doctrine.  On this view, the kind of situa-
tion dealt with by promissory estoppel is one in which, even though
there is no consideration and/or assent to be bound, it is clear from
the context that the promisor (e.g., an employer) never would have
made certain promises (e.g., new employee benefits) if she didn’t ex-
pect to get something of quite tangible value from the employee (e.g.,
enhanced, on-the-job effort).  Rather than making legal enforceability
of such a promise depend upon the promisee’s attorney’s craftiness in
finding legal consideration and assent, promissory estoppel seemingly
allows a much more straightforward path to recovery:  establish that
the employer made a promise and that the employee relied and—
given that the promise was made in the employment context—that a
reasonable expectation of reliance and hence damage recovery should
follow more or less automatically.
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
33
Id. § 90.
34
For a classic statement regarding the objective theory of assent, see Judge Learned
Hand’s opinion in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
1911).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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Courts have not agreed.  In such employment benefits cases, they
generally have denied recovery on promissory estoppel grounds.36
The obstacle has been that there typically is no concrete act of reli-
ance induced by the employer’s promise (e.g., where is the act of reli-
ance by an existing employee who simply continues in her existing job
after the employer promises new benefits?).  More generally, finding
an act of reliance and tying it to the promise may be just as formalistic
an exercise as finding consideration.
I doubt that the drafters of the Restatement would have conceded
this.  Even if they had, they would have argued that promissory estop-
pel was, in any event, intended not as a modest remedy for cases of
formalistic underenforcement, but as a bold and (according to Grant
Gilmore)37 revolutionary recognition of reliance itself as a basis for
promissory liability.  On this second justification, promissory estoppel
seeks to remedy the apparent ex post injustice suffered by those who
have suffered losses in reasonably relying on promises.  Promissory es-
toppel is, this view holds, all about the prevention of injustice.  How-
ever, unless it is always unjust for someone to suffer detriment in reli-
ance upon a broken promise, the bottom-line problem is to deter-
mine just when it would be unjust to allow such detrimental reliance
to go without compensation.
In comment b to section 90, the drafters of the Restatement pro-
vided some factors for courts to look at in making this determina-
tion.38  These boil down to an inquiry into the promise that induced
the reliance—was it the kind of formal, complete, and deliberate
communication that should have been expected to induce reliance
36
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 185 (3d rev.
ed. 2003).
37
See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (12th prtg. 1982) (arguing
that section 90 has “swallowed up the bargain principle of [section] 75” and that, un-
der modern contract law, “the ‘probability of reliance’ may be a sufficient reason for
enforcement without inquiring into whether or not there was any ‘consideration’”).
38
The comment reads:
 The principle of this Section is flexible.  The promisor is affected only by
reliance which he does or should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary
to avoid injustice.  Satisfaction of the latter requirement may depend on the
reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance, on its definite and substantial char-
acter in relation to the remedy sought, on the formality with which the prom-
ise is made, on the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and
channeling functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise,
and on the extent to which such other policies as the enforcement of bargains
and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981).
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and upon which one would reasonably rely?—and the reliance thereby
induced—did the promisor, by inducing the reliance, really cause
substantial, measurable harm?  If the answer to each of these ques-
tions is “yes,” then courts generally find that it would be unjust not to
provide recovery on a promissory estoppel theory.39
A third justification for promissory estoppel is that it has proven to
be an enormously powerful tool for recovering damages for promis-
sory breach in circumstances in which it is quite clear that the parties
have not yet reached what the common law deems a legally enforce-
able agreement.  While there are many such circumstances, one espe-
cially important context for the application of promissory estoppel has
been that of failed negotiations.  In a typical failed negotiations case,
the parties have been negotiating over a cooperative venture or trans-
action—I shall use the two interchangeably—and have made various
optimistic assurances or promises to one another to the effect that the
transaction would happen, but those assurances went unfulfilled be-
cause one party, the faithless suitor, walked away.  The other party, the
disappointed suitor, insists that the parties had a deal—a contract—
that has been breached.  But because any number of terms were never
hammered out during the negotiations or because the parties ex-
pressly may have included language in some of the earlier negotiating
39
Both Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:  Contract
Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985), and Edward Yorio &
Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991), purported to find
from their reading of section 90 cases that courts were not taking seriously the inquiry
into reliance and that results in section 90 cases turned solely upon the type of promise
and the context within which it was made.  See Farber & Matheson, supra, at 904-05
(surveying over 200 promissory estoppel cases from 1975 to 1985 and asserting that, in
spite of the continued use of the “language of reliance,” courts had developed a new
rule whereby “any promise made in furtherance of an economic activity is enforce-
able”); Yorio & Thel, supra, at 113 (arguing that, in section 90 cases, “[a] promise will
be fully enforced . . . if the promise is proven convincingly and is likely to have been
serious and well considered when it was made”).  More recent case commentators,
however, have concluded that courts still insist upon proof of “definite and substantial”
reliance before awarding recovery on a promissory estoppel theory.  See Sidney W. De-
Long, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel:  Sec-
tion 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 948 (analyzing all reported promissory es-
toppel cases in 1995 and 1996 and concluding that “[c]ontemporary courts rigorously
enforce Section 90’s requirement that the promise induce actual reliance by the prom-
isee”); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel:  An
Empirical and Theoretical Study , 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582-83, 582 n.15 (1998) (review-
ing 362 federal and state cases between 1994 and 1996 and noting “the crucial role re-
liance plays in courts’ decisions either to deny or affirm a promissory estoppel claim at
a preliminary motion or final judgment stage of a litigation”).
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documents to the effect that they did not intend to be bound until the
execution of a final written contract, courts will find (often as a matter
of law) that there was no contract.  Having incurred potentially large
expenses in what it says was reliance upon various assurances made by
the faithless suitor, the disappointed party seeks recovery of at least its
reliance expenses on a promissory estoppel theory.
For generations of contracts scholars and students, the case of
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.40 has made the argument in favor of al-
lowing recovery on a promissory estoppel theory in such a case.  In
Hoffman, an innocent, inexperienced rural baker was enticed to do a
whole series of costly and difficult things—selling his bakery, buying
and then selling a grocery store, obtaining an option on a piece of
land—by a sophisticated, big-city franchisor’s repeated promises and
assurances that, if the baker only did one more such thing, then he
would become one of their franchisees.41  The franchisor did not grant
Mr. Hoffman the franchise, and he was left in a far worse position
than he had been in before he met with Red Owl.  Such a case seems
to epitomize the intuitive case for promissory-estoppel-based liability
for precontractual negotiations:  There was nothing good about what
the franchisor did, no reason for it to repeatedly promise a franchise
to Mr. Hoffman—the franchisor was simply a bad actor who either
negligently or intentionally (but for unknown reasons) inefficiently
induced reliance.
Now this story relies an awful lot on sympathy for Mr. Hoffman,
the unsophisticated rural baker duped into a veritable reliance free
fall.  One would perhaps have predicted that the first thing hard-
hearted economic analysts would do when they turned to analyze
Hoffman would have been to try to explain why the case was wrong,
why liability was not after all appropriate.  For whatever reason, this is
not what occurred.  Instead, economic analysts of contract law came
to view Hoffman as exemplifying the other side of the reliance prob-
lem:  the specter of inefficient underreliance.42  This problem can be
seen most directly by supposing that the law did not award any remedy
40
133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
41
Id. at 268-71.
42
For classic statements with regard to this argument, see Craswell, supra note 17,
at 489-95 (emphasizing the extent to which Red Owl might have benefited had the
contract been formed); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?:  The Economics of Promis-
sory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1270-77 (1996) (addressing
the “incentive problem”).
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for breach.  As explained earlier, just as people overinvest in reliance
upon contractual promises when the law fully compensates them in
the event of breach regardless of their level of reliance,43 so, too,
would they underinvest in reliance upon promises if the law did not
compensate their losses (or compensated them too meagerly) in the
event of breach.  While there may not have been a formal contract in
Hoffman, it is easy to imagine that the value of the franchise—if one
had been awarded—would have been greater by virtue of Mr. Hoffman’s
precontractual reliance expenditures.  If this is so, then Mr. Hoffman’s
reliance may well have been efficient.  But a person will not incur such
early reliance expenditures if she later can be held up by another
party who blithely claims that, since there was no contract when the
reliance expenditures were incurred, it therefore has no obligation to
pay for any of those expenditures, or even to finish the negotiations,
thus inducing the relying party to agree to terms that mean a net loss
for her.
This problem is known in the economic theory of contracts as a
contractual “holdup problem.”44  There are a variety of potential solu-
tions to the holdup problem.45  One is for the law to compensate some,
but not all, of such early (or precontractual) reliance—some, to give
the promisee an incentive to incur efficiently early reliance costs, but
not all, lest the promisee incur reliance costs that are inefficiently
large.  First set out by Richard Craswell46 and Avery Katz,47 this solution
to the “precontractual reliance” problem was refined and extended by
Lucian Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar,48 who demonstrated formally (that
43
See supra text accompanying notes 21-28 (addressing the conditions that breed
overreliance).
44
Ben-Shahar, for example, describes the problem as follows:  “The holdup prob-
lem arises when parties cannot contract over reliance expenditures due to high trans-
action costs, non-verifiability of the investment, and strategic considerations.”  Ben-
Shahar, supra note 1, at 1848 n.37.
45
For a useful survey and explanation of such possible solutions, see Edlin, supra
note 11, at 176-78.
46
See Craswell, supra note 17, at 495-97 (arguing that courts will often find a com-
mitment binding one party to a failed negotiation when reliance by the other party
would have been efficient).
47 See Katz, supra note 42 (illustrating a “regulatory approach” to promissory estop-
pel).
48
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 423 (2001).
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is, mathematically) that various kinds of intermediate liability rules
will optimally calibrate such reliance expenditures.49
III.  THE MODEL OF RELIANCE:  ITS EMBODIMENT IN A
“NO-RETRACTION” PRINCIPLE THAT CREATES MORE
RELIANCE PROBLEMS THAN IT SOLVES
It is this latter model that provides the basis for the efficiency ar-
guments Ben-Shahar presents in favor of his no-retraction principle.50
In Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction regime, a disappointed relying party
can always threaten credibly to impose liability for her reliance dam-
ages upon a faithless suitor who walks away from the negotiations fol-
lowing the reliance.51  The temptation for a faithless suitor to allow or
even encourage such reliance by promising to pay for it (either di-
rectly or through a sufficiently high price proposal) and then reneg-
ing on the promise disappears because the disappointed relying party
can always do better by suing for her reliance costs (under the con-
tract as originally proposed by the faithless party) than by agreeing to
the holdup.  Rather than bearing the entire reliance cost—which he
would do if he tried to hold up the relying party, who would sue and
get back her entire reliance expenditure—the faithless suitor is better
off staying with the negotiations and agreeing to a price that effec-
tively shares the reliance investment between the parties.  The no-
retraction regime thus eliminates, says Ben-Shahar, the specter that
parties will refuse to incur efficient early reliance expenses, lest they
be held up afterward by faithless suitors who refuse to share those ex-
penses.52
The no-retraction regime does indeed protect early reliance ex-
penditures, but it raises an even more serious problem, one that
economists have not worried about because it does not exist under the
existing doctrinal structure governing liability for precontractual reli-
ance.  The problem is that (as Ben-Shahar’s title clearly indicates),
under the no-retraction regime, a party can foist a legal obligation to
reimburse its reliance expenses upon any other party simply by incur-
ring those expenses.  This threat, in turn, will often lead the victim of
49
Id. at 456-57.
50
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1847-53 (outlining the efficiency-based implica-
tions of his no-retraction principle).
51
Id. at 1849.
52
Id. at 1849-50, 1849 nn.39-40.
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such unwanted reliance to contract with the relying party even when it
is inefficient for her to do so.  Suppose, for instance, that a really pro-
ductive employee can, by spending a mere $20, generate $100 in value
for a firm (for a net increase of $80), while an unproductive employee
can generate the same $100 value only by spending $95 (for a net in-
crease of $5).  Efficiency obviously requires that the employer hire the
productive employee.  Under the no-retraction regime, however, once
the unproductive employee has made her $95 investment, the em-
ployer is better off sticking with that employee and sharing that em-
ployee’s reliance costs and the value that such costs have generated
than she would be by contracting with the productive employee and
reimbursing the unproductive employee’s $95 reliance cost.  The rea-
son is that, under the no-retraction regime, the employer must pay
the inefficient employee’s $95 reliance expense regardless of whether
she “retracts” and so cannot be made better off by retracting and go-
ing with the more efficient employee.  Crucially, such inefficiency arises
only because the inefficient $95 reliance expenditure has already been
incurred.  (If it had not been spent, then even if the employer had a
contract with the inefficient employee, she could bargain with that
employee, sharing the gains from efficient breach to get the em-
ployee’s consent to such breach.)  Any regime that insures early reli-
ance, as does the no-retraction regime, creates a profound disincen-
tive to efficient breach.
Ben-Shahar seems to be unaware of this problem.  He does discuss
what he calls the “[u]nwanted [t]ransactions” problem,53 but what he
means by this is not transactions that are intentionally and strategically
foisted upon people by virtue of early unwanted reliance, but rather,
the problem that compensating the reliance expenses incurred by an
initial, potential contracting partner may often create a disincentive to
switching partners when a better (net-value-increasing) partner some-
how materializes.54  What he says about his problem is not particularly
persuasive, but what he does not even address—the problem of strate-
gic use of early reliance to force parties into inefficient transactions—
is much more serious.
This problem is far from fanciful.  Indeed, from my own reading
of cases involving the application of promissory estoppel to the pre-
liminary negotiation or precontractual context, my impression is that
53
Id. at 1852-53.
54
Id. at 1852.
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the reason why businesspeople incur substantial reliance expenses be-
fore they have reached agreement is not because they are naïve about
contract law and think that they really do have a legally enforceable
agreement, but because they know that they do not yet have a deal
and are fearful that the other party will soon do the deal with some-
one else.  Such businesspeople incur premature reliance expenses for
two reasons:  first, to pressure the other party into thinking that it will
indeed incur potential contractual liability if it doesn’t agree to go
ahead with the prematurely relying party and, second, to persuade the
other party that they really can do the job (on the seller’s side) or
come up with the necessary financing (on the buyer’s side).55  The
presence of such interactions even under the existing doctrinal setup
governing precontractual liability strongly suggests that Ben-Shahar’s
no-retraction regime would induce precisely the kind of behavior that
centuries of common law judges have been worried about in fashion-
ing rules designed to discourage the “officious intermeddler” who is
so well known in the law of restitution.56
In my view, the effect of Ben-Shahar’s proposal in encouraging
such inefficient intermeddling is likely to swamp whatever efficiency
benefits it might have in encouraging early reliance.  In my ongoing
reading of the cases involving the application of promissory estoppel
in preliminary negotiations, I have seen very few in which it seems that
early reliance—reliance before agreement had been reached—was
necessary to increase the value of the deal.  Instead, parties seem to
make premature reliance investments for precisely the sort of strategic
reasons discussed above.57  Moreover, there are many cases in which
the only reliance expense claimed by the plaintiff is its cost of trying to
55
For an example of a case involving the second line of reasoning, see GSGSB, Inc.
v. New York Yankees, 862 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing a dispute in
which the plaintiff architectural firm performed preliminary work and sought financ-
ing in order to secure a contract with the defendants), aff’d, Nos. 95-9272, 96-9202,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17433 (2d Cir. July 9, 1997).
56
For one discussion of the “officious intermeddler,” see Saul Levmore, Explaining
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 65 (1985) (“The rule is, of course, that . . . ‘officious in-
termeddlers’ do not recover in restitution even if they can prove their expenses or the
value of their provisions.”).
57
See, e.g., Walser v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 43 F.3d 396, 402 (8th Cir.
1994) (affirming the district court’s limitation on the damages available to a prospec-
tive car dealer in part because there was only a very short period of time during which
the prospective dealer could have relied as he had been quickly told that the deal had
turned sour); Doll v. Grand Union Co., 925 F.2d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding
no liability where developers obtained options on land for a supermarket project with
only a preliminary “indication of interest” from the anchor tenant).
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negotiate the failed deal.58  While the cases do present situations in
which a bargainer relies even though it clearly knows that an agree-
ment has not yet been reached, the cases do not seem to me to de-
scribe situations in which it was efficient for bargainers to rely at such
an early stage in the bargaining process.  This is to say that the cases
do not present situations involving the potential for the kind of
holdup problem that Ben-Shahar’s no-retraction regime is designed
to address.  One suspects that a primary reason why the cases don’t
display the holdup problem is because, whenever early reliance in-
vestment really is valuable, the party making that investment does not
actually do so until she gets an agreement allocating the cost of that
investment and insuring her of some return on it.  From my read of
the cases, innocents like Mr. Hoffman, who incur big reliance costs
without any agreement regarding the allocation of those costs, are
rare.  Indeed, one must wonder whether Mr. Hoffman was not in fact
so innocent, whether he might well have been a strategic, premature-
reliance investor who just happened to lose his bet.59
IV.  MODELS OF INVESTMENT VERSUS MODELS OF INFORMATION:
UNDERSTANDING THE REAL PROBLEM POSED BY
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
In response to my article, Communication and Courtship:  Cheap Talk
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation,60 that was published a
couple of years before the publication of their joint work, Bebchuk
and Ben-Shahar defended,61 and Ben-Shahar now again defends,62 the
58
See, e.g., Budget Mktg., Inc. v. Centronics Corp., 979 F.2d 1333, 1334 (8th Cir.
1992) (affirming the district court’s decision that any reliance that may have been in-
curred was not reasonably incurred); see also Budget Mktg., Inc. v. Centronics Corp.,
927 F.2d 421, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1991) (remanding the case for further consideration of
a claim for various negotiation expenses based on the promissory estoppel theory).
59
This conjecture is supported by Mr. Hoffman’s relative success in the business
world.  After the Hoffman case concluded, Mr. Hoffman got a job as a salesman for the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company where, after winning honors for achieving the
highest sales, he was promoted to the position of District Manager for Milwaukee.  1
STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS:  LAW IN ACTION, 403-04 (2d ed. 2003).
60
Johnston, supra note 13.
61
See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 48, at 452 (dispelling the “common
view . . . that imposing liability for precontractual reliance will discourage parties from
entering negotiations”).
62
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, at 1850-52 (recognizing and responding to the
claim that parties would be discouraged from entering negotiations or establishing
precontractual understandings with a no-retraction regime).
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no-retraction liability regime against the general objection that their
regime creates an inefficient disincentive for parties to enter negotia-
tions in the first place.  That the no-retraction regime has the poten-
tial to do so is intuitively obvious, for under that regime, terminating
negotiations almost automatically results in liability for the disap-
pointed party’s negotiating expenses.  In Contracts Without Consent,
however, Ben-Shahar confidently concludes (and demonstrates with a
numerical example)63 that the no-retraction regime “will unambigu-
ously lead the parties to enter into negotiations in more cases in which
there is a potential surplus than they would in the absence of liabil-
ity.”64
This statement is true.  When the parties enter negotiations al-
ready knowing that there are mutually beneficial gains from trade
to be had and that those gains will be increased by early reliance, the
no-retraction regime—by eliminating the holdup problem that would
eliminate the incentive to make such early reliance investments—
makes such negotiations more profitable.  But this admittedly true re-
sult is largely irrelevant to the class of problems that judges deal with
when they have to decide whether the parties reached agreement be-
fore one of them walked away from a negotiation.  Whether one
calls it “precontractual negotiation” or “dealmaking,” the kinds of trans-
actional negotiations that have generated the body of case law answer-
ing the question “when do the parties become legally bound?” do not
involve negotiations over known gains from trade, but whether gains
from trade exist in the first place.65  When negotiating over the divi-
sion of a pie, parties face conflicting interests.  When deciding whether
to invest to increase the size of the pie before those negotiations have
even concluded (the holdup specter), the parties’ interests conflict
even more sharply, for the relying party can actually be made worse
off, while the other party can be made very well off indeed.  When ne-
gotiating to determine whether to do a transaction, however, the par-
ties do not generally begin knowing that the deal will work.  Rather,
63
Id. at 1849 nn.39-40, 1851 n.45.
64
Id. at 1851.
65
I cannot provide here a catalogue of cases supporting this assertion, but cases
such as R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 72-74 (2d Cir. 1984), in
which a deal fell apart because the parties could not agree on the territorial extent of
the fast food franchise being negotiated, are typical.  In such cases, the failure of the
parties to agree upon a key term signals that there may have been no agreement on
that term, and hence no deal, which would have made them both better off relative to
the status quo.
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their first problem is to determine whether there is a “pie”—a “coop-
erative surplus,” in the language of game theory—for them to worry
about dividing.
In these circumstances, when the parties are negotiating to de-
termine whether gains from trade exist, rather than how to split
known gains, their interests are often not conflicting, but shared.  In
such a negotiating context, reliance expenditures are not made to in-
crease the value of the transaction, but to gain information as to
whether a mutually beneficial transaction can be somehow arranged.
The relevant question regarding potential legal liability in the event
that such negotiations fail to culminate in an executed transaction is
not whether such liability can create incentives for optimal early reli-
ance, but rather, whether such liability improves or harms incentives
for information transmission, whether such liability makes it easier or
harder for the parties to determine whether there are gains from
trade to be had, and whether the prospect of potential legal liability
causes the market for potential transactions to become bigger or
smaller.
In my above-referenced article, Communication and Courtship,66 I
used some ideas from non-cooperative game theory to develop a
framework for answering these questions.  That framework rests upon
the game-theoretic distinction between costly signals and cheap talk.67
When a person sends a costly signal—such as by achieving a college
degree—the signal may send information to other market partici-
pants—such as that the person is talented and will have high labor
market productivity—but regardless of whether it communicates such
information, sending the signal imposes a direct cost on the sender—
in the example, the opportunity and direct costs of college.  Even
though it may communicate information to the market, contrasting
cheap talk has no direct cost.  It costs nothing, for example, for a re-
cent college graduate to say that she is “incredibly enthusiastic” about
a particular job opening with a potential employer with whom she is
already speaking.  By the same token, one may well suspect that such
cheap talk is not likely to convey any real information to the employer.
After all, wouldn’t every jobless, job-hungry, recent college graduate
in a tight job market have said that she was “incredibly enthusiastic”
about the job opening?
66
Johnston, supra note 13.
67
For more detail on this distinction than I have space to provide below, see id. at
404-39.
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This question may seem virtually rhetorical, logically requiring a
“yes” answer.  Such an answer is not, however, necessarily the correct
one.  Underlying the idea that costless talk can never be informative is
an intuition about the strategic context in which such talk occurs.
This intuition has two parts:  a feeling, first, that parties who are bar-
gaining or negotiating, or are even talking about bargaining or nego-
tiating, are likely to be adversaries engaged in a game with conflicting,
rather than corresponding, interests and, second, that, when there are
several actors on each side of the discussions—lots of potential buyers
and sellers, for example—they all have the same interests.  For ease of
reference, I will call these the assumptions of “conflicting interests
across sides of the market” and “shared interests within the sides of
the market.”  If it seems obvious that all the recent college graduates
in my hypothetical will want to say that they are “incredibly enthusias-
tic” about the job opening, then it is only because we are implicitly
supposing that, although the employer wants to hire the best-qualified
applicant for the lowest possible salary, every recent graduate wants
the job, regardless of whether or not she is qualified, and at the high-
est possible salary.  In this implicit scenario, the applicants are all the
same—they all desperately need and want this job—but their interests
are opposed to those of the employer.  Because all such applicants will
say that they are “incredibly enthusiastic” about the job, the statement
“I am incredibly enthusiastic” does not convey any information about
the particular applicant’s type (that is, about whether she is or is not
well qualified for the particular position).
Not every situation involving cheap talk involves such conflicting
interests across sides of the market or shared interests within each side
of the market.  Indeed, even in this simple example, we may think it
unlikely that all the recent college graduates really want this particular
job.  Someone who is grossly underqualified for this offered position
may be better off simply telling the prospective employer that she is
not interested, rather than expressing interest and then going
through a costly and time-consuming interview process that will even-
tually lead to her rejection anyway.  Employers are not likely to be
identical either.  An employer seeking a position suitable for a person
with relatively little experience may not want to hire someone who
is overqualified and who will be disenchanted and unproductive if
underemployed.  Such variation within each side of the market radi-
cally transforms the strategic incentives for cheap talk communica-
tion.  Relatively highly qualified job candidates may declare that they
are “not interested” in lower-echelon jobs in which less qualified job
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candidates say that they are “incredibly interested.”  Similarly, highly
qualified candidates may say that they are “incredibly interested” in
jobs requiring a high level of skill and experience, while less qualified
candidates state that they are “not interested” in such jobs.
The lesson from this simple example is in fact very general:  When
there are at least some shared interests across the market (something
that is very likely to be true when there are divergent interests within
each side of the market), transactional cheap talk can be credible and
informative.  To see how this lesson applies to help us understand
whether potential legal liability encourages or discourages parties
from communicating socially valuable information by making prom-
ises, observe that “promises” are just a species of linguistic convention
used to convey present intentions about future actions.  Assuming
away social or other nonlegal sanctions, if the law does not impose li-
ability for the failure to keep a promise, then a promise is just another
kind of cheap talk.  By imposing liability for broken promises, the law
can convert what would otherwise be cheap talk into a costly signal.  If
what one is concerned about is creating incentives for informative
promising, then the question is whether promises are likely to be in-
formative even when they are cheap talk.
In my article referenced above, I demonstrate not only that there
are general situations in which promissory statements are likely to be
informative when they are cheap talk, but also that, in those situations,
promises are likely to be informative only if they are cheap talk.68  In
other words, it is sometimes true that a promissory statement will be
informative only if there is no liability in the event that the promised
action is not forthcoming.  Loosely speaking, the situations in which
informative promising depends upon the freedom from potential
contractual liability arise early in the dealmaking process, when com-
munications are being sent to and from a large number of heteroge-
neous buyers and sellers.  In such situations, buyers and sellers share
an interest across the market in minimizing the transaction costs of
failed dealmaking by attracting and continuing to talk only to those
market actors on the other side of the market with whom they have
a reasonable chance of ultimately transacting.  Market pessimists can
convey pessimism quite easily without risking legal liability.  It is, after
68
See id. at 412 (“[T]he informativeness of precontractual talk may depend upon
the fact that it is cheap talk . . . .”); see also text accompanying notes 60, 66 (providing
further background about this article’s place in the debate at hand as well as its sub-
stantive arguments).
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all, quite easy to sound gloomy about the prospect of ever transacting
with someone.  Market optimists, however, may quite naturally use
promissory language like “we’ve got a deal” or “everything looks ready
to go” when all they mean to say is that a deal is very likely, relatively
speaking.  Understood as statements regarding the ultimate probabil-
ity of a deal, such statements may be perfectly truthful.  Especially at
early stages of the dealmaking process, “very likely” does not mean
“certain.”  At such stages, a party’s optimistic, promissory statements
may be completely informative and truthful and yet be perfectly con-
sistent with the failure ultimately to transact.  Crucially, were liability
imposed every time such an early optimistic assurance was not fol-
lowed eventually by a successful transaction, the incentive to send such
optimistic assurances would often be eliminated.  (More precisely, it
would be eliminated in those cases in which there is a relatively high
probability of not ultimately transacting—cases in which the elimina-
tion of incentives for optimistic talk is actually most likely to cause
market pessimists to withdraw from the market entirely.)
This same analysis shows that, later in the bargaining process,
when the number of parties has been winnowed down to one or only a
few on each side of the transactional divide, liability for optimistic,
promissory statements is likely to enhance, rather than destroy, incen-
tives for informative communication.  Early-stage cheap talk allows
parties the freedom to discover whether or not there are indeed likely
gains from trade.  Late-stage communication affects primarily the
magnitude and distribution of the gains from trade.  At such late
stages—roughly corresponding to the classic “offer-counteroffer” pat-
tern of give-and-take negotiations69—statements such as “ask” and “of-
fer” prices will be informative only if they are legally binding (that is,
only if they are not cheap talk, but rather, costly signals of future in-
tent).
The prescriptions generated by this analysis for when promis-
ing should be cheap and when it should be costly closely track the
doctrinal line that common law judges have drawn between contract
and no contract.70  As best illustrated by the modern test for when
69
For a discussion about this pattern, see Johnston, supra note 13, at 442-55, 497-
99.
70
See id. at 439-83 (elucidating contractual theory through the analysis of a num-
ber of cases).
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agreement is reached in complex business transactions,71 common law
judges have, on my analysis, been very sensitive to the strategic struc-
ture of dealmaking and have understood that, while it is important
that promising remain cheap early in the dealmaking process, it is
equally important that it be costly later in the process.  Cases that
seem to create exceptions to this doctrinal pattern—such as the deci-
sion in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co.,72
holding that a commercial loan commitment letter constituted a bind-
ing preliminary agreement73—are in fact perfectly consistent with this
pattern.  By enforcing explicit agreements to alter the doctrinal line
between agreement and no agreement, these cases merely affirm that
the doctrinal line is indeed a contract default rule that the parties may
shift by mutual assent.
Judicial decisions involving the application of promissory estop-
pel, by contrast, have tended to create an economically unjustified risk
of legal liability for early-stage promising.  They have done so by giv-
ing a dealmaking party the ability to constrain the other party’s op-
tions by unilaterally deciding to incur reliance expenditures.  When
negotiations start out on an optimistic note but begin to sour, the dis-
appointed party may be well aware that it is about to lose a hoped-for
market opportunity.  If the disappointed party relies, however, the
other party’s (the promisor’s) options are now constrained:  It must
either go ahead with the deal or walk away and face the prospect of
reliance-based liability.  While it is true that the better decisions in-
volving the application of promissory estoppel to the dealmaking con-
text do allow a promisor to escape liability by, in effect, discouraging
such early-stage reliance,74 there is no need for such doctrinal com-
plexity.  The better and simpler approach is for courts to make prom-
ise liability turn upon the doctrinal determination of whether or not
the parties had or had not yet reached agreement, an approach which
draws a relatively clear line between liability-free, early-stage promis-
sory talk and liability-triggering, late-stage promissory talk.  That line,
after all, is a default line, and if the parties do not find it in their joint
interest to postpone liability, they can and do explicitly say so.
71
This test is set out in R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74-77
(2d Cir. 1984).
72
670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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Id. at 499.
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This possibility was suggested by Marilyn Miglin, Inc. v. Gottex Industries, 790 F.
Supp. 1245, 1250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Thus, on my analysis, while the courts have perhaps been a bit too
hospitable toward precontractual liability claims based on a theory of
promissory estoppel, they have developed a body of doctrine that draws
a line between the early “no agreement/no liability” stages and the
late “agreement/liability” stages in transactional negotiation that tends
to accord strikingly well with what is economically efficient.  On my
view of the world, the simple dichotomy between agreement and no
agreement that courts rely upon in determining when a negotiating
party’s promissory statements begin to trigger potential liability if they
are not fulfilled is not only much simpler, but also much more eco-
nomically sound, than is the admittedly creative, but ultimately disas-
trous, no-retraction regime suggested by Professor Ben-Shahar.
